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ABSTRACT
Following extensive debates about post-democracy and post-politics, scholarly attention
has shifted to conceptualizing the ongoing transformation of democracy. In this
endeavour, the change in understandings, expectations and functions of political
participation is a key parameter. Improving citizen participation is widely regarded as
the hallmark of democratization. Yet, a variety of actors are also increasingly
ambivalent about democratic institutions and the further expansion of participation.
Meanwhile, new forms of participation are gaining in signiﬁcance – neoliberal
activation, the responsibilization of consumers, digital data mining, managed behaviour
guided by choice architects – which some believe much improve representation, but
which others perceive as a threat to the citizens’ autonomy. This article introduces a
special issue focusing on the participation-democratization nexus in well-established
democracies in the economically aﬄuent global North. Based on a critical review of
popular narratives of post-democracy and post-politics we sketch the notion of the post-
democratic turn – which oﬀers a new perspective on emerging forms of participation
and in this special issue serves as a conceptual lens for their analysis. We then revisit
more traditional conceptualizations of democratic participation which are challenged
by the post-democratic turn. The article concludes with an overview of the individual
contributions to this special issue.
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1. Introduction
The diagnoses of post-democracy and post-politics,1 predictably, have proved short-
lived. For about a decade they energized and at the same time paralyzed debates
about the condition and perspectives of Western liberal representative democracies.
Yet, the banking and ﬁnancial crisis since 2008, the tide of right-wing populism and
the climate and sustainability crisis have initiated waves of politicization and triggered
new claims for democratic empowerment at both ends of the ideological spectrummore
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powerful than anything Western, supposedly depoliticized and apathetic polities have
experienced in decades. Not only has the voter turnout in many recent elections –
such as the presidential elections in the US (2016), national elections in the UK
(2017) or Germany (2017), and the last election to the European Parliament (2019) –
once again increased. But the paralyzing consensus of hegemonic neoliberalism –
that to the rule of the global market there is no alternative – seems to have collapsed,
too, reopening the arena for a variety of new nationalisms, lively debates on the end
of capitalism,2 new forms of socialism or communism3 and competing visions of a
socio-ecological transformation of capitalist consumer societies.4 So, are democratic
polities, after the long debate about the recession and possible death of democracy,5 wit-
nessing its resuscitation and the rebirth of the political? To be sure, diverse political
actors are vociferously re-asserting the right to democratic self-rule; there are powerful
demands for more citizen participation; the claim that “the dominant forces in today’s
polities are not those of democratic will”6 seems rushed; and the diagnosis of a new “wave of
autocratization”7 is rather undiﬀerentiated. Still, the repoliticization of many western(ized)
polities – as demonstrated also by the manifold forms of urban micro-politics and exper-
imental niche movements, the Gilets Jaunes in France or the international protests of
Fridays For Future and Extinction Rebellion – is, very evidently, also not simply the
rebirth of the kind of politics which, according to theorists of post-democracy and post-
politics, hegemonic neoliberalism had snuﬀed out. Despite some obvious similarities, this
new politicization does not reinstate the participatory revolution8 and the emancipatory
agendas of the 1980s, nor are these new social movements the organization and mobiliz-
ation of the modern precariat, the post-industrial service proletariat, which many left-
wing thinkers have long been waiting and hoping for.9 Instead, Western liberal representa-
tive democracies are experiencing a rapid and profound transformation of democratic insti-
tutions, democratic values and the democratic project. If only tentatively, focusing, in
particular, on well-established democracies in the economically aﬄuent global North –
and explicitly rejecting the overly simplistic notion of “autocratization” – we refer to this
transformation as democratization beyond the post-democratic turn.10
In this transformation, the change in understandings, expectations, forms and func-
tions of political participation is a centrally important parameter. Participation is a con-
stitutive element of democratic politics; enhancing the opportunities for and quality of
citizen participation is widely perceived as the hallmark of democratization; and for
democratic systems, participation is the most important source of legitimacy. Yet,
depending on its understanding, the expansion of participation does not only entail a
promise of democratic empowerment, but may also be perceived as a threat. Already
in the early 1960s, when Almond and Verba ﬁrst diagnosed what they called a partici-
pation explosion, they were concerned that the new emancipatory impulse may actually
destabilize rather than improve liberal democracy.11 In the mid-1970s, Huntington,
Crozier, King and others raised concerns that the democratic distemper, energized by
the value and culture change which Inglehart12 then called the silent revolution,
might lead to state overload, a condition of ungovernability and a crisis of democracy.13
Today, even in the most established democracies, demands and expectations in terms of
participation continue to rise. But the recent tide of right-wing populist movements, in
particular, has given new credence to the old belief that responsible and competent gov-
ernment necessitate less popular participation rather than more.14 Indeed, with the pol-
itical culture in many polities becoming increasingly polarized, illiberal and post-
deliberative, the expansion of citizen participation is, once again, widely regarded as
370 I. BLÜHDORN AND F. BUTZLAFF
a potential threat, both to democratic norms and to competent and eﬀective policy
making. Fridays for Future protesters, for example, are not primarily demanding a
democratization of climate politics, but they are calling on the state and its policy
experts to translate, with no further delay, scientiﬁc ﬁndings into eﬀective policy.
And a range of other political actors, too, are, for a variety of reasons, increasingly
ambivalent about democratic procedures and the desirability of the further democrati-
zation of policy making.15 Meanwhile, neoliberal thinking, the spread of the consumer
culture, the digital revolution and advances in behavioural economics research prompt
new understandings and forms of participation – the activation of citizens by the neo-
liberal state, the responsibilization of consumers, digital data mining to inform policy
decisions, managed behaviour guided by choice architects aiming to correct erroneous
beliefs of citizens about their true best interest – which would traditionally not have
been regarded as democratic participation. These new forms of participation are said
to empower citizens and facilitate much better representation of their interests and
responsiveness to their needs than established forms of political articulation, organiz-
ation and representation could ever achieve. Others, however, are concerned that
these innovations are a threat to democracy, disempower and objectify citizens and,
essentially, are a form of abuse.16
These new understandings, forms and functions of political participation – and the
impact of their proliferation on democracy and the democratic project – are what the
contributions to this special issue aim to explore. The transformation of democracy of
which they are a part is, we are suggesting, the transformation towards a democracy
beyond the norm of the autonomous subject and mature citizen.17 In eco-political
theory, for example, some have toyed with the notion of “post-sovereign subjectiv-
ities”,18 but democratic theorists, tied by their established normative commitments
– most notably to this idea of the autonomous subject – and torn between the
lament for the “recession” or “retreat” of democracy19 and the struggle for its resus-
citation, are still ﬁnding it diﬃcult to grasp this transformation. Yet, as the narratives
of post-democracy and post-politics as well as the hopes for an egalitarian, radically
democratic post-capitalist society are proving increasingly questionable, empirically,
the attempt to conceptualize it might become more feasible. For exactly this
purpose we are using the notion of the post-democratic turn. It propels, we are
suggesting, the transformation of democracy beyond the autonomous subject and
mature citizen. And for the analysis of the well-established democracies of the
aﬄuent global North at least, it is exactly the conceptual tool which according to
some has so far been missing.20
In this article, our aim is to map out the terrain for the ongoing redeﬁnition of pol-
itical participation and to work towards an agenda for the academic investigation of its
changing interpretations and functions. Based on a critical review of popular narratives
of post-democracy and post-politics (Section 2) we begin to develop the much more
ambitious notion of the post-democratic turn (Section 3) that, we suggest, oﬀers an
innovative perspective on changing notions, forms and functions of political partici-
pation, and that in this special issue serves as a conceptual lens for their analysis. Set
against this concept’s background, section four calls to mind how major strands of
democratic theory have traditionally conceptualized the role of participation and
explores how these established understandings are being challenged by the post-demo-
cratic turn. In the concluding section, we provide an overview of the contributions to
this special issue.
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2. Approximations to post-democracy
The post-democratic turn21 marks the transition, and propels the transformation, to a
new form of democracy that reﬂects distinctive features of modern consumer societies.
The term draws on the debates on post-democracy and post-politics which have been
ongoing since the late 1990s, but it is clearly distinct from both of these concepts.
Yet, a critical engagement with these terms and debates is a useful steppingstone
towards the much more radical diagnosis and ambitious concept of the post-democratic
turn.
Post-democracy and post-politics have become enormously popular terms. They
are widely used to describe a variety of phenomena and may articulate a range of con-
cerns, normally implying some kind of critique of some deviation from established
democratic norms or expectations – which often remain rather unspeciﬁc. Normally,
users of these terms implicitly assume that this deviation can be reversed and that
there is a strong societal desire to do so. In fact, they are commonly employed as
mobilizing and campaigning tools and as conceptual vehicles for the articulation of
democratic commitments – which, given the wide range of diﬀerent understandings
of democracy, may, however, be very diverse. Indeed, these concepts may carry diag-
noses and agendas to which authoritarian right-wing populists subscribe, just as much
as they may support political narratives promoted by liberals or by egalitarian radical
democrats. In any case, they create a discursive space for the performance and cele-
bration of – some kind of – democratic norms and commitments in a context where
egalitarian, participatory, liberal, inclusive and redistributive values are openly chal-
lenged by a variety of political actors.22 And they allow for the discursive reassertion
of such norms and values to go along with the radical deconstruction and reconstruc-
tion, normatively as well as empirically, of liberal representative democracy. In fact, as
we will elaborate further below, precisely this may well be the reason for the impress-
ive success and popular appeal of these terms. For the analysis of the transformation
of contemporary consumer societies and their understandings of democracy, however,
they are not very helpful, not least because they conceal – strategically or not – at
least as much as they reveal.
From the perspective of social and democratic theory, especially the more popular
versions of the post-democracy and post-politics diagnosis are unhelpful. Firstly, they
seem to imply a uniform and consensual deﬁnition of democracy and politics, i.e.
they do not spell out whether they refer to any particular variety of democracy or to
the idea and project of democracy as a whole. Secondly, the preﬁx “post-” seems to
suggest a linear trajectory and non-reversible development of democracy – and focusing
on the alleged recession, regression or retreat of democracy and the political, these con-
cepts make no attempt to capture what is, supposedly, emerging instead. And thirdly,
the diagnoses of post-democracy and post-politics reliably trigger a range of academic
reﬂexes and objections which are not only in themselves simplistic but which further
deﬂect attention from the important task to conceptualize the ongoing transformation
of contemporary politics and democracy. For example, theorists of post-democracy and
post-politics have been accused, time and again, of romanticizing an alleged golden age
of democracy; their diagnoses have been criticized as far too generalizing and system-
atically unable to do justice to the diversity of contemporary forms of activism, social
movements and micro-politics23 (also see Meyer in this special issue); and narratives
of post-democracy and post-politics are widely portrayed as overly pessimistic and
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politically paralyzing, and as the articulation of the psychological condition of the pol-
itical left rather than a suitable diagnosis of contemporary democracy, politics and
society.24
Colin Crouch’s well-known account of post-democracy25 is the most prominent
example of these rather simplistic narratives. The notion of post-politics – which is
more prominent in the work of Rancière,26 Žižek27 or Mouﬀe28 – does not play a sig-
niﬁcant role for Crouch; it is important only in that, like Boggs29 and many others, too,
he suggests that in contemporary Western democracies citizens just play “a passive,
quiescent, even apathetic part, responding only to the signals given them”.30 His under-
standing of post-democracy as a kind of democratic theatre disguising that, factually,
“politics and government are increasingly slipping back into the control of privileged
elites”31 seems intuitively plausible and is much in line with the much older critique
of symbolic politics.32 Crouch points to a number of interdependent reasons for the
emergence of the post-democratic state of politics. Inter alia, he refers to a moderniz-
ation-induced and supposedly irreversible “entropy of democracy”.33 Ultimately,
however, he locates the “true causes of the problems” in “the proﬁt-seeking behaviour
of the large corporations” which “are destroying communities and creating instability
the world over”, and in “a political class which has become cynical, amoral and cut
oﬀ from scrutiny and from the public”.34 Constructing a clear cut opposition
between, on the one hand, “small circles of overlapping business lobbyists and a poli-
tico-economic elite”35 who are “reducing” citizens “to the role of passive, rare partici-
pants”36 and, on the other, those “who were cowed by the apparent superiority”37 of
neoliberal ideology, but whose “massive escalation of truly disruptive actions”38 will,
at some stage, launch “a counter-attack on the Anglo-American model”,39 Crouch
mobilizes a well-known political logic and oﬀers a narrative that talks to popular
needs and sentiments well beyond the post-Marxist critical left. Sociologically,
neither his claim that the decay of democratic processes and institutions has been
induced primarily by sinister and corrupt elites is quite satisfactory, nor his narrative
of an egalitarian counterattack on the prevailing order of socio-ecological exclusion
and destruction. In fact, both suggestions directly contradict Crouch’s own hypothesis
of the irreversible entropy of democracy. Yet, by assigning unambiguous roles and
responsibilities, he oﬀers a perspective of clarity and hope and allows for the experience
of collectivity, unity, empowerment and popular sovereignty. In fact, as signalled above,
the contradictory simultaneity of this discursive celebration of egalitarian-democratic
commitments and the likely empirical irreversibility of democratic entropy may be
the very core of his booklet’s irresistible appeal.
In comparison, Rancière’s conceptualization of post-democracy and post-politics,
which he actually developed well before Crouch popularized the term, is much less
accessible, activist and prone to the temptations of popular simpliﬁcation. It is, there-
fore, more resilient to the objections outlined above, and from an academic, rather
than activist, point of view it is much more instructive. Rancière does not derive the
notions of post-democracy and post-politics from the idea and critique of corrupt,
power-seeking and oppressive elites; and he supplements the common understanding
of the end of politics “as the end of a particular period of time” – namely “the
century of the dream of the people, of promised communities and utopian islands”40
– by a second understanding that is a-temporal: The end of politics, he notes, “seems
to split into two endings which do not coincide – the end of promise and the end of
division”.41 The former, he suggests, i.e. the end of promise, marks the starting point
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for “the party of the new time” – that of pragmatic, managerial, day-to-day public
administration; and the latter, i.e. the end of division, launches “the party of the new
consensus” beyond all radical conﬂict.42 Thus, Rancière moves beyond the post-
Marxist paradigm of domination and oppression, and opens up spaces for a much
wider range of perspectives on post-democracy and post-politics. He also does not
glorify any assumed golden age of democracy, nor any vision of a true and authentic
democracy to be realized in some utopian future. And portraying the end of politics
as a “party”, he furthermore does not share the one-dimensionally negative perspective
that became prevalent when Crouch popularized the term post-democracy. Instead,
Rancière – quite rightly – describes depoliticization as “the oldest task of politics”43
and an indispensable and constitutive element of “the art of politics”.44
Thus, in a number of respects, Rancière’s work provides cues which in the more
popular debate remain largely unexplored. Two particularly instructive points
concern, ﬁrstly, what Crouch may be sensing when he refers to the irreversible
entropy and the parabola of democracy,45 but which he then loses sight of due to his
focus on power and domination: There is a dynamic inherent to democracy that
propels its transition to post-democracy. And secondly, Rancière’s conceptualization
of the consensual order of post-democracy and post-politics – which, in his model, is
not simply imposed by hegemonic neoliberalism, but constituted, maintained and
defended (policed) collaboratively by a wide range of societal actors. Both points are
directly related to his speciﬁc understanding of the demos, of democracy and of politics.
For Rancière the demos is, on the one hand, the collective and homogenous subject of
political sovereignty and, at the same time, a dispositif of irreducible plurality, conﬂict
and subjectivation. As a political subject, it is continually emergent and the process of its
self-constitution (subjectivation) collapses in the moment of its fulﬁlment, i.e. when
radical diﬀerence and conﬂict have been overcome, and unity and consensus achieved.
Accordingly, democracy is the political struggle for subjectivation and inclusion by
newly emerging identities who, as yet, do not have an equal voice. At the same time,
however, it is also the struggle for the maintenance of diﬀerence, disagreement and
conﬂict, which the idea of the collective, sovereign subject actually seems to annul.
And politics, for Rancière, is the persistent contestation of the rules of inclusion and
exclusion (the police) which constitute the demos, i.e. the continuous deconstruction
and reconstruction of the subject of political sovereignty and the symbolic constitution
of the social.46
So, for Rancière, the demos, democracy and politics are inherently paradoxical
notions. They are projects of reﬂexive self-negation. By implication, the dynamic of
post-democracy and post-politics is not exogenous to these ideas but, as their dialectic
counterparts, systematically built into them. Quite clearly, capitalism and neoliberalism
play an important role but, ultimately, this dynamic unfolds irrespective of the forces of
capital, capitalism and neoliberal ideology; and post-democracy and post-politics are
not simply a deformation and pathology of late-modern and advanced capitalist
societies. They may, indeed, be “better understood as a modality of governance”47
which engages a variety of actors who collaboratively police a consensual –
yet always precarious – order.48 Putting it in Rancière’s words, post-democracy and
post-politics are “a consensual practice of eﬀacing the forms of democratic action”,
“the practice and conceptual legitimization of a democracy after the demos”.49 These
terms do not imply that this consensus policing the established order necessarily
needs to be hegemonic; for, Rancière’s understanding of post-democracy and
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post-politics does leave spaces for the continuation of political struggles and the per-
formance of new subjectivities. But, very importantly, this understanding of post-
democracy as a collaborative form of consensual governance policing the symbolic
order of the social shines a bright light on the wide-ranging engagement and complicity
of diverse actors in today’s post-democratic politics.50 The popular and populist narra-
tives of post-politics, in contrast, as well as the analyses in terms of autocratization, are
all about concealing and denying the very idea of any such complicity.
3. The post-democratic turn
For the diagnosis and notion of the post-democratic turn, which serves as the conceptual
frame and analytical lens for the investigation of changing interpretations and functions
of political participation in the contributions to this special issue, exactly this consensus
and complicity are constitutive. The concept draws on Rancière’s – dialectical and post-
Marxist – rather than Crouch’s understanding of post-democracy. Yet, it re-inserts
Rancière’s conceptual dialectic into the dimension of time and newly introduces an
aspect that in his a-temporal thinking does not ﬁgure at all: the modernization-
induced transformation of social value-preferences and notions of subjectivity, which
Almond and Verba recognized when they diagnosed the participation explosion,
which Crozier and colleagues saw as the trigger of a looming Crisis of Democracy,51
and which Inglehart then claimed52 would render modern societies ever more liberal
and democratic.53 Processes of “modernization and post-modernization”,54 Inglehart
has argued ever since, place ever greater importance on values of self-determination
and self-expression, with modern citizens becoming increasingly articulate, partici-
pation-oriented and politically self-conﬁdent, and conditions for democracy, suppo-
sedly, becoming ever more favourable.55 The notion of the post-democratic turn
acknowledges that in contemporary consumer societies values of self-determination,
self-expression and self-experience are, indeed, highly developed, and expectations in
terms of democratic participation, representation and policy responsiveness are,
unquestionably, articulated very vociferously. But rejecting Inglehart’s rather undiﬀer-
entiated understanding of emancipative values and his narrow ﬁxation on liberal
democracy, the concept focuses attention on the changing social norms on the basis
of which a variety of actors in contemporary societies are challenging and (re)politiciz-
ing established societal arrangements, which condition the clearly visible reconstruction
of democratic institutions, and which inform the current reformulation of the demo-
cratic project beyond its liberal understanding.
Centrally important in this respect is that in the wake of ongoing processes of value
and culture-change, as signalled above, democratic norms have become highly ambiva-
lent and are – for example in light of accelerating climate change or right-wing populist
mobilization – perceived as a threat at least as much as they entail a promise. As regards
democratic participation, citizen expectations are certainly rising, and decentralized,
participatory procedures have, accordingly, become a constitutive part of public
policy making and good governance.56 At the same time, however, conﬁdence in the
eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness of democratic institutions and participatory procedures is
rapidly eroding. As modern societies’ multiple crises are proliferating, so are doubts
about the capability of democratic systems to resolve them.57 And in many cases,
initiatives for more engagement, participation and self-responsibility are not only per-
ceived as enabling and empowering – for example, if they originate from the activating,
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neoliberal state seeking to devolve established obligations, responsibilities and commit-
ments. Instead, diverse social groups, ranging from the much-debated losers of modern-
ization via the educated, cosmopolitan middle class to neoliberal elites are “losing faith
in democratic government” and governance.58 They are all aﬀected, though each for
diﬀerent reasons, by modern societies’ “democratic fatigue syndrome”.59 In fact, the
spreading perception of a dysfunctionality of democracy60 – discussed in much more
detail in Blühdorn’s contribution to this special issue – has given rise to a legitimation
crisis61 that aﬀects not only the established institutions of liberal democracy, but the
normative core of the democratic project in a much more encompassing sense.
Together, this rise in expectations of democratic participation and self-determi-
nation, on the one hand, and this legitimation crisis of democracy, on the other, are
constitutive elements of the post-democratic turn and the post-democratic constellation
to which the latter gives rise. Furthermore, drawing on the work of Žižek,62 Bauman,63
Sennett,64 Reckwitz65 and others the diagnosis of the post-democratic turn acknowl-
edges that ongoing processes of societal modernization have steadily chipped away –
and continue to do so – at the protestant-Kantian-bourgeois understanding of the
autonomous subject and mature citizen. This Enlightenment idea of the autonomous
subject is the normative core of the democratic project. The Kantian-bourgeois tra-
dition – working on the assumption of a universal, all-embracing reason from which
the norms of autonomy, equality and all universal rights are derived – had conceptual-
ized this autonomous subject as the reason-oriented, self-controlled, responsible, moral
and, ideally, mature subject with a singular, consistent and stable identity and character.
In contemporary consumer societies, however, this particular understanding of auton-
omy and subjectivity is being challenged – and perhaps superseded – by much more
elastic, complex and dynamic ideals of subjectivity. And in contrast to their Kantian-
bourgeois predecessor, contemporary notions of autonomy, identity and subjectivity
are much less averse to the oﬀerings of the consumer industry and much more
relaxed about supposedly categorical imperatives of reason, responsibility, equality,
morality, inclusion, truth, maturity and so forth.
In the literature on post-democracy and post-politics, these important cultural shifts
– which Blühdorn’s contribution to this special issue elaborates in much more detail –
receive very little attention. Yet, their impact on the condition and further development
of democracy can hardly be overestimated. Taking this value and culture shift into
account, the concept of the post-democratic turn suggests that in contemporary
Western consumer societies the democratic project, as the new social movements of
the 1970s and 1980s had still conceptualized it – egalitarian, deliberative, inclusive,
responsible, cosmopolitan – is becoming increasingly exhausted and is unlikely to be
revived by any “massive escalation of the truly disruptive action”. Such escalations
may well have to be expected – and, as signalled above, are already occurring. Yet,
they are unlikely to reinstate earlier, more inclusive, redistributive and transnationally
oriented visions of democracy and agendas of democratization. Whilst many commen-
tators still emphasize that “generally the movement is towards greater distrust of auth-
ority and more desire for accountability, freedom, and political choice”;66 whilst they
reassure us that in view of the current “wave of autocratization” “panic is not war-
ranted”,67 and signs of democratic “retrogression” and “cultural backlash” are ephem-
eral phenomena set to subside as “the dynamics of modernization” take contemporary
societies back onto their normal trajectory of democratization,68 the notion of the post-
democratic turn suggests that this dynamics eﬀects a profound transformation of
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democracy and democratization beyond liberal, egalitarian and inclusive understand-
ings of the autonomous subject. In line with Rancière’s thinking, it suggests that this
transformation is not very well conceptualized as a retrogression or a pathology of
late modern societies.69 Also, it is not simply imposed on citizens by anti-egalitarian,
autocratic elites, but the concept of the post-democratic turn holds that it needs to
be understood, at least as much, as an emancipatory, a progressive, project that is actively
pursued and jointly policed by a broad coalition of societal actors.
Thus, the notion of the post-democratic turn – as a value- and culture-shift taking
contemporary consumer societies beyond the Kantian-bourgeois understanding of
the autonomous subject and mature citizen – moves well beyond the established
debates about post-democracy and post-politics. It radically changes the perspective
on the ongoing transformation of democracy. One may well wish to reject the norma-
tive agenda that, according to this concept, propels this transformation. But in terms of
its analytical capacities, the perspective of the post-democratic turn reaches well beyond
the backward-looking lament for a lost, allegedly golden age of democracy and the
sociologically implausible stories of an imminent relaunch of “the dream of the
people, of promised communities and utopian islands”. It does not in any way imply
a normative endorsement of the changes it diagnoses, but it turns to exploring how
in contemporary consumer democracies, political institutions and the democratic
project itself are being remoulded in line with a modernization-induced value- and
culture shift. Whilst much recent work on political participation – and the literature
on post-democracy and post-politics, in particular – still focus on the question how
more and better citizen participation may improve governance and render democracy
more authentic,70 this new conceptual lens sheds light on the ambivalence of partici-
pation. It oﬀers a new perspective on the activating state and various other actors
redeﬁning political participation so as to mobilize citizens as a resource for agendas
which no longer contribute to democratic subjectivation and empowerment in the tra-
ditional sense. And it sheds new light on the fact that in increasingly polarized and post-
deliberative polities, and in view of the erosion of civic culture, the further expansion of
participation actually presents a major challenge. In a quite practical sense, the diagno-
sis of the post-democratic turn raises the questions: What may democracy, democrati-
zation and democratic governance mean in a scenario where processes of
modernization and emancipation are taking modern societies beyond the established
understandings of the autonomous subject and mature citizen? How may – and do –
modern polities redeﬁne participation to reﬂect the needs of diverse societal actors as
well as the state’s need for democratic legitimation? How may – and do – contemporary
consumer societies accommodate ever rising demands for more direct and more
eﬀective participation and, even under conditions of post-factuality, post-deliberation
and polarization, still avoid government overload and ungovernability? How may –
and do – they manage the ever-rising complexity, volatility and irrationality of the
democratic sovereign? How may – and do – they resolve the post-democratic
paradox,71 i.e. the tension between the proliferation and radicalization of participatory
demands, on the one hand, and the ambivalence towards democratic institutions, pro-
cesses and values, on the other?
These are questions which the theorists of post-democracy, post-politics and auto-
cratization prefer not to recognize, let alone address. But for the contributions to this
special issue they delimit the research agenda. They all have an analytical as well as a
normative dimension. The emphasis here is clearly on the former; for, the concept of
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the post-democratic turn is no more than an analytical lens. Accordingly, the objective
here is not to provide any form of advice on how governments could or should address
or resolve the challenges that confront them. In particular, the objective is explicitly not
to provide any form of justiﬁcation or legitimation for the political practices and shifts
that we investigate. Instead, we seek to shed light on new understandings, forms and
functions of political participation, to help explain their factual proliferation, and to
explore how they challenge established notions of democratic participation. With this
latter point in mind – and as a ﬁnal step of our eﬀort to set an agenda for the investi-
gation of political participation beyond the post-democratic turn – we therefore want to
revisit how major strands of democratic theory have traditionally conceptualized politi-
cal participation in democratic polities. In particular, we are interested in the central
role they all assign to the norm of the autonomous subject and mature citizen –
which is a key respect in which political participation beyond the post-democratic
turn is radically diﬀerent.
4. Traditional conceptualizations
In traditional democratic theory, political participation has mostly been investigated
and conceptualized as organizing legitimation for political decision makers and govern-
ment policies.72 Theories of liberal democracy, which for a long time represented the
mainstream of democratic theory,73 have derived the ability of political participation
to generate legitimacy from every individual’s right to self-determination and political
equality.74 They regarded individual interests as given and assumed that the diversity of
interests articulated in the political arena invariably leads to societal conﬂicts which
democratic systems need to pacify. Accordingly, the quality of democratic processes
was to be measured by their ability to give a voice to these diverse interests and syn-
thesize the related conﬂicts into political decisions carried by broad citizen support.75
At the same time, participation understood in this way was seen to contribute to the
two key functions of democratic procedures distinguished by Dahl in his classic work
on democracy: the exercise of popular sovereignty and the contestation of power
through electoral competition. Both are realized, according to liberal democratic
theory, through the articulation and negotiation of interests mainly in democratic elec-
tions and by means of representation.76 Because the competition for power and the
regular exchange of government elites play a crucial role in this reading, liberal demo-
cratic theory has traditionally placed strong emphasis on institutions and societal
macro-structures which are supposed to safe-guard inalienable individual rights and
the equal consideration of individual interests.
When looking at today’s Western democracies, it is this reading and repertoire of
participation, in particular, that in many polities is visibly in decline. Established politi-
cal institutions that for a long time had mobilized and coordinated democratic partici-
pation – political parties and associations, trade unions – are shrinking in line with the
decline of conﬁdence in liberal representative democracy as a mechanism to ﬁnd a
balance and compromise between the interests of diﬀerent societal groups. Diverse pol-
itical actors77 from across the ideological spectrum78 increasingly demand direct par-
ticipation and political impact that is not mediated through representatives. In
contemporary consumer societies the exercise of popular sovereignty and the contesta-
tion of power are ever less strongly associated with mediating political institutions, but
378 I. BLÜHDORN AND F. BUTZLAFF
are increasingly understood as the direct and undistorted transmission of particular
interests and an assumed will of the people.
Theorists of participatory and deliberative democracy, in contrast, have considered
political participation as the key mechanism for nurturing and reproducing democratic
values and a democratic culture. Both work on the assumption that the process of pol-
itical participation inﬂuences and transforms the citizens involved, as well as the way in
which they perceive their societal environment. Both strands of theorizing assume that
for their own reproduction and stability democracies rely on socio-cultural precondi-
tions which cannot be taken for granted but must carefully be cultivated.79 Yet, they
diﬀer in terms of their respective focus. Participatory approaches highlight the eﬀects
of democratic participation on the individual: Engagement with the issues of
common interest is expected to promote individual growth and self-eﬃcacy.80 This per-
spective takes up Alexandre de Tocqueville’s accounts of North America’s civil society
of the nineteenth century and his perspective on participation through associations as a
“school of democracy” guaranteeing the continuous reproduction of the “democratic
citizen”.81 Theories of deliberative democracy, in turn, place more emphasis on nurtur-
ing a discursive political culture and on the collective negotiation of the common
good.82 Rather than just articulating and balancing individual interests, processes of
deliberation are expected to reframe interests and reconﬁgure actor constellations.
For, citizens deliberating upon matters of the collective are expected to provide
public justiﬁcation for their views, give full consideration to competing positions, estab-
lish a shared sense of responsibility and ideally achieve rational agreement between all
parties involved.83
Reaching well beyond the realm of democratic theory, participatory and deliberative
ideals have, in recent decades, had major impact on the political practice of modern
democratic polities.84 Yet, the educative and transformative eﬀects predicted by theor-
ists of democracy have remained questionable. Many of their assumptions regarding,
for example, the willingness to engage, deliberate, justify and transform have proven
untenable. Most notably, but by no means exclusively, the suspension of deliberative
discourse by right-wing populist movements and their intentional shift of focus from
the overarching societal good to deliberate strategies of societal fragmentation, polariz-
ation and exclusion provide evidence that participation per se does not necessarily lead
to more liberal, tolerant, inclusive and consensus-oriented attitudes, but may actually
cultivate and reinforce social conﬂict (see Strassheim in this special issue).85
All three strands of democratic theory – liberal, participatory and deliberative –
understand political participation as facilitating the formation of political subjectivities
commanding the right and ability to self-articulate, to engage in political discourse, and
to secure equal recognition in the democratic negotiation of the common good. All
three of them subscribe to the agenda of empowerment, autonomy and subjectivation;
they are all based on the Enlightenment norm of the autonomous subject – which, as a
normative ideal, is the precondition and, empirically, the envisaged outcome of the
democratic process. But as outlined above, this Enlightenment norm, due to the com-
mitments that come with it, has in modern consumer societies become rather ambig-
uous. The formation and stabilization of political subjectivities prove increasingly
diﬃcult; being an autonomous subject and mature citizen may even appear burdensome
and undesirable. Against this background, described above as the post-democratic turn,
new “objectifying” forms of political participation – such as survey research, mass
data collection, political articulation via consumer choices and retrospective policy
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approval – are gaining prominence. They relieve the pressure on citizens to exercise and
demonstrate their status as autonomous subjects. They liberate citizens from the civic
duties and commitments – such as political engagement, rational deliberation, public
justiﬁcation, equal recognition of others – that come with the norm of the autonomous
subject and mature citizen. But in a revised way, they still convey a sense of citizen
empowerment and popular sovereignty.
Policy analysis- and governance-centred approaches to democratic theory have been
perceptive to these new conditions and requirements: they have conceptualized demo-
cratic participation, ﬁrst and foremost, as a tool for enhancing the output of policy pro-
cesses.86 Given the shrinking mobilization capacity of the established channels of
democratic interest aggregation, more information on local contexts and the citizens’
preferences needs be obtained through other, more direct forms of citizen participation,
so as to facilitate better-designed policy solutions. Rather than as an aim in itself, an
exercise of subjectivation or the reproduction of democracy’s socio-cultural foun-
dations, these approaches frame participation as a strategic means to the end of gener-
ating output legitimacy for policies and democratic institutions.87 Put diﬀerently: These
approaches provide clear evidence of a major change in prevailing understandings of,
and functions assigned to, political participation in contemporary democracies. Increas-
ingly, participatory processes are evaluated either with regard to the skill levels of par-
ticipants (participation is perceived as superior, if participants are more skilled and
better informed)88 – or in terms of their ability to express the attitudes and demands
of citizens in a seemingly objective way, for example by gathering data about citizen
behaviour or consumer choices (see Ulbricht and Maxton-Lee in this special issue).
Furthermore, political participation has, in the more recent literature, also been con-
ceptualized as a top-down rather than bottom-up process, initiated and controlled by
policy elites which activate and engage citizens in decision-making procedures in
order to increase policy compliance, minimize public resistance at the stage of policy
implementation, or prompt particular forms of behaviour (see Maxton-Lee and Stras-
sheim in this special issue). From this perspective, expanding participation is a strategy
to pre-empt societal opposition, to accommodate demands for co-determination in
politics and society and to preserve a sense of self-determination even in contexts
which leave citizens essentially no autonomy. Whilst critics have often highlighted
the manipulative and abusive quality of such forms of managed participation,89
others have conceptualized the simulative performance of equal interest recognition
and popular sovereignty as a distinctive feature of political participation beyond the
post-democratic turn, and as a way of maintaining the notion of democratic input-legit-
imation while allowing for more competent government and avoiding veto powers
impairing policy eﬃciency.90 Thus, the increase in importance of output-centred demo-
cratic legitimation seems to go along with the strengthening of eﬀorts to discursively
perform citizen empowerment, system responsiveness and the sovereignty of the
people.91 Indeed, empirical studies show that these objectivating understandings of
democratic participation, i.e. approaches which are not much concerned with citizen
empowerment and autonomy, but regard citizens, ﬁrst and foremost, as a resource to
be mobilized, utilized and strategically managed, have been gaining traction of late.92
And the concomitant mainstreaming of participatory and deliberative procedures
may have to be read as being part of a compensatory exercise of simulating sub-
jectivation and empowerment. Table 1 indicatively summarizes how major strands of
democratic theory have traditionally conceptualized political participation, how
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socio-cultural developments conceptualized here as the post-democratic turn have ren-
dered their assumptions questionable, and how in the wake of the post-democratic turn
political participation is being reinterpreted.
5. The contributions to this special issue
Having outlined the conceptual frame and analytical lens for the investigation of new
forms of political participation; having sketched the research questions to which the
notion of the post-democratic turn gives rise, and having called to mind traditional con-
ceptualizations of participation which today appear increasingly questionable, we ﬁnally
want to provide a preview of the contributions to this special issue. First Ingolfur Blüh-
dorn further develops the conceptual foundations for the contributions that follow.
Starting out from the diagnosis of a democratic fatigue syndrome noticeable in many
well-established consumer democracies, he describes the post-democratic turn as a dia-
lectic process in which the dynamics of modernization, emancipation and democratiza-
tion persistently chip away at the very foundations of democracy. In particular,
Blühdorn further elaborates how in aﬄuent consumer societies in the global North, pre-
vailing understandings of subjectivity and autonomy have changed and how, accord-
ingly, democratic values, needs and expectations are changing, too. He thus seeks to
explain why diverse political actors have become strikingly ambivalent about demo-
cratic institutions and processes, and why demands for the expansion of participation
are perceived as a threat as much as an opportunity. Blühdorn concludes by exploring
how the ongoing change in prevailing understandings of subjectivity, autonomy and
identity recondition the democratic project.
John Meyer elaborates on the critique of the notions of post-democracy and post-
politics – and, to an extent, also takes issue with the much more ambitious notion of
the post-democratic turn. The function of his contribution is to critically challenge
and elaborate the limitations of the post-politics perspective. Meyer points to the tem-
porality of the post-politics diagnoses and suggests that politicization and depoliticiza-
tion are better understood with a cyclical approach and as recurring waves. He rejects
the claim that ours is a distinctly post-political era, cautions against undue generaliz-
ations, and re-emphasizes that in a variety of forms, political action and participation
are all around us.
Table 1 . Democratic participation and the post-democratic turn.
classical interpretations based on
the autonomous subject
established assumptions
challenged by the post-democratic
turn
new interpretations beyond the
autonomous subject
articulation of individual interests;
assertion of individual rights;
legitimation of power and policies
(priority for liberal democracy)
consistent and stable values,
interests, identities, subjectivities
that can be organized and
represented
harvesting information for better
policies (governance and policy
analysis approaches)
education and development of
citizens (priority for participatory
democracy)
willingness to engage and
participate in the school of
democracy
secure more eﬃcient policy
implementation (governance
and policy analysis approaches)
negotiation of common good;
transformation of articulated
interests; formation of collective
subjectivities; reconﬁguration of
actor coalitions (priority for
deliberative democracy)
common rationality as a medium
for deliberation and agreement;
commitment to public
justiﬁcation and social
inclusiveness; willingness to
transform
performance of responsiveness,
civic self-determination and
popular sovereignty (simulative
democracy)
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Lena Ulbricht then actually turns to a new understanding and form of participation
that is rapidly gaining signiﬁcance as modern societies enter the digital era. Her focus is
on practices of gaining information about citizens through automated analysis of digital
trace data which are repurposed for political and policy-making purposes. She analyses
how in increasingly complex, diﬀerentiated and liquid93 societies, political actors are
using automated data mining and data analysis as a strategy of identifying the
people’s will, i.e. as a form of democratic participation and representation that works
even in a constellation where traditional understandings of the political subject have
been superseded by much more complex, liquid, volatile and contradictory subjectiv-
ities. Data mining, scraping the demos, Ulbricht argues, is widely portrayed as a way
of knowing the demos and its true interests that is superior to any form of election,
opinion polls, census data or survey research. Yet, it is a form of participation that
conﬂicts with established notions of the autonomous subject and mature citizen. In a
sense, it responds to the speciﬁc condition and dilemmas beyond the post-democratic
turn, yet the expansion of this kind of participation does not easily qualify as
democratization.
Bernice Maxton-Lee investigates political consumerism as a contemporary form of
political participation. In societies which are strongly market-based and conditioned
by neoliberal thinking; in a context where the market has permeated even the most
private areas of life and every form of activity is governed by market choices, consumer
decisions, Maxton-Lee suggests, are widely portrayed as an increasingly important,
powerful and inﬂuential form of political articulation and participation. Digitalization
and the harvesting of consumer data are an important issue here, too. But Maxton-Lee
focuses, more speciﬁcally, on the responsibilization of consumer-citizens whose consu-
mer power, supposedly, puts them in a position to address particular problems – such as
the multi-dimensional sustainability crisis – much more eﬀectively than national gov-
ernments can. Just like the mining of digital trace data, consumer choices also seem to
be a form of political participation and policy legitimation that helps to confront the
challenges and dilemmas of the post-democratic turn. Yet, the responsibilization of
consumer-citizens, Maxton-Lee argues, instrumentalizes citizens for purposes which
are not their own, assigns responsibilities to them which they cannot meaningfully
take and reduces political issues to economic issues.
Holger Strassheim then sheds light on a third form of participation beyond the
autonomous subject: His contribution deals with preconﬁgured choice architectures
designed by behavioural experts. In terms of the instrumentalization of citizens for
agendas which they may not even be aware of, let alone control, this behavioural man-
agement goes even a step further than the activation of consumer-citizens. But as the
established ideal of the mature, responsible and rational citizen is in decline; as
modern polities seem to become ever more polarized, and political discourse and delib-
erative procedures are increasingly perceived to amplify cognitive distortions and aggra-
vate rather than appease social conﬂicts, Strassheim argues, modes of cognitive and
behavioural corrections by policymakers and experts, may appear increasingly necess-
ary and legitimate. However, behavioural governance is yet another form of citizen
engagement that bypasses – the remains of – the autonomous subject and mature
citizen. Rather than democratizing modern societies, it empowers experts and grants
them undue epistemic authority.
In the concluding article Felix Butzlaﬀ once again links each of the contributions
back to the research questions speciﬁed earlier in this introduction. He elaborates
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how, beyond the post-democratic turn, new technology-based, market-based and
expert-led reinterpretations of political participation on the one hand preserve the
norm of empowerment, autonomy and democratic sovereignty, but at the same time
also move beyond the Kantian-bourgeois notions of subjectivity and maturity which
have traditionally been the normative core of democracy. Drawing on Robert Dahl’s
understanding of democratization and his criteria for evaluating the quality of demo-
cratic systems, Butzlaﬀ assesses how the new forms and interpretations of participation
dealt with in the individual contributions to this special issue aﬀect the quality of
modern democracies. From Dahl’s particular perspective, Butzlaﬀ argues, these inno-
vations invariably appear as regressive and in violation of democratic norms; yet, in
the wake of the post-democratic turn, he concludes, these criteria must themselves be
reviewed.
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